Mariology of Blessed John Duns Scotus: Mary in Relation to Christ, The Predestination of Mary PDF Print E-mail
Written by Fr. Rugero Rosini   
Saturday, 29 August 2009 00:00
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The position of Christ

As we have seen, the entire theology of Scotus is articulated about the nature of predestination characterized by a thesis of capital importance. The primary free act involved in being is an act of love: precisely that act of pure love eternally unfolding in the bosom of the Trinity. Our present subject is this: how is this manifested externally?

And here our Doctor responds: "I say, therefore, God loves himself in the first place; in the second place he loves himself in others and this love is holy; in the third place-speaking of love on the part of a being outside himself-he wills to be loved by Him [the man-God] who can love in the highest degree; and finally, in the fourth place, he foresees the union (to the Word) of that nature which shall love him in the highest degree, even if no one had fallen," 1 or even more emphatically, "even if no one but Christ had ever been created."

It is clear, therefore, that the Incarnation, the "greatest work of God," could not possibly be occasioned, nor could it occupy a secondary place in the divine plan.

In fact, if every soul's predestination to glory precedes the foreknowledge of sin, then it is even more true of that soul which is predestined to the maximum glory. 2

Since he who wills in orderly fashion, first wills that which is closest to the end, 3 then logically Christ, predestined precisely to be the Head of the heavenly court, 4 occupies first place in that order of willing.

If all of the elect were foreseen and willed to be "co-loving" (condiligentes), 5 how much more the scope of such foreknowledge in respect to Christ. Christ can glorify, and in fact glorifies, the Trinity in a measure greater than all other beings taken together. Rather, their praises can rise to God only by means of Christ and with Christ: "co-loving" (loving with Him and not without Him).

Therefore, Christ too has been foreseen like all of the rest of the elect, according to St. Jerome's expression, "ante fabricam mundi" [before the foundation of the world]. 6 Christ also originates from the divine Goodness, that Goodness which in a singular way desires to communicate itself without the Godhead and therefore is object of absolute predestination: together with all of the elect, Christ also is included in the "complete" number of the predestined. What distinguishes Christ from the rest of the elect is that of being willed first, being closest to the end. 7

Neither the divine plan-as understood by our Doctor-nor the order of persons dominating that plan, let it be noted, are simple hypotheses, as some would have us believe. 8 It is revealed truth that the world was conceived and willed as good (cfr. Gen 1:1-31), and likewise that this was realized in Christ and through Christ (Jn 1:1-3, Eph 1:3-6, Col 1:15-20, Rm 8:29-30).

Before closing this section it is appropriate to point out some features distinctive of the specific mode of Christ's predestination, features which will have an important impact on various mariological questions.

For the sake of clearer understanding we will present these points in the form of questions.

1) In all creation Christ has the supreme glory; what is the cause of this? Scotus responds that Christ owes the gift of supreme glory to the fact of the hypostatic union. In the order of execution, the hypostatic union precedes that glory and therefore becomes a disposition for that glory. 9 He writes that Christ "would not have had such glory, nor would He have been so full of grace and truth, unless His nature had subsisted in the subject [Person] of theWord." 10

2) Was Christ predestined first to glory or to the hypostatic \uniori? It is a question which Scotus himself raises: "Utrumprius \praevidebatur isti naturae unio velgloria?" 11 And he responds Ito that question in this way: "Videtur quod gloria prius.,." 12 Sticking to his principle that predestination first regards the end (which is glory) and then the means (the hypostatic union being among these), Christ too, according to the Subtle Doctor, was first predestined to glory and then to union. 13

3) Did Christ merit for Himself union and grace? He merited neither the one nor the other for Himself, and this absolutely. Both of these-union and grace-were conferred without any merit, neither on Christ's part nor on the part of anyone else. This is the fundamental privilege which belongs solely to Christ. On this subject our Doctor is categorical; he maintains: "among all of God's works there is found no work of pure grace, if not the Incarnation of the Son ofGod alone."14 And this is so because such a conferral "had to manifest the supreme mercy of God by bestowing the supreme good of grace independently of merit." 15

However, what Christ did not merit for himself, He merited for everyone else, without exception (either among angels or among men), Christ being the single depository and unique source of grace, since God decreed that "there would be but one Head in the Church, from whom grace would flow into the members." 16Hence "all other glory of everyone else capable of blessedness (both angel and man), falls under and is foreseen in terms of merit (not that of the Blessed, but of Christ); hence, these merits too (of Christ in relation to the blessed), fall under predestination"17

The position of Mary

Having examined the nature of predestination and determined the place which Christ occupies in the divine decrees, we can next readily specify the place occupied by Mary in relation to the same decrees.

Let us recall that because predestination according to Scotus concerns all the blessed equally, Christ included, it concerns Mary as well. Hence, she too was foreseen with Christ and with all the other blessed "before the foundation world was made," 18 independently of any personal merit or demerit whatsoever; Mary too, like Christ and the blessed, was uniquely willed in order "to love," namely to be "co-loving";19 she too, like Christ and all of the blessed, makes up part of that "heavenly court," variously ranked in accord with their degree of proximity to Christ as "Head";20 in summary, she too belongs to that absolute and simultaneous predestination insofar as it is formally an "act of the divine will." 21

Once predestination is seen from this angle the formula of Ineffabilis Deus, "uno eodemque decreto," 22 not only holds for Christ and Mary, but for all of the blessed as well who are predestined with them for glory. In other words the Bull states that Mary was not foreseen first (before sin) and Christ after (after sin). In that case we would have two separate decrees. Rather all were predestined by one and the same decree which-according to the scotistic understanding-cannot be other than absolute and simultaneous, Christ, Mary, and all the other blessed included: one and the same decree for all, foreseen before sin.

With regard to the end, namely glory, we have perfect unity. Glory by its nature is one and the same for all since it is a gift which excludes any personal merit whatsoever by the blessed; this is so true that not even Christ-as we have said-merits glory for Himself. Therefore, the distinction of that same glory according to its various degrees is to be sought in relation to proximity of those degrees to that same end.

Indeed our Doctor writes thus: "In general, anyone who wills in an orderly manner, first wills that which is closest to the end." 23

It is on the basis of this principle that all the degrees of predestination are determined: from the highest to the lowest. Naturally, the highest is assigned to Christ; Scotus holds, "God first wills the glory of Christ's soul, and not the glory of another soul";24 this is so because Christ's soul is closer to the end by virtue of His union to the Person of the Word.

In relation to this highest or first rank are determined all the other rankings on the basis of their proximity to the end. And, after Christ, who shall be closest to the end? The answer can be none other than this: Mary.

We are not dealing here with a simple deduction, but rather a logical consequence. No creature-angelic or human-can have or even claim to have a proximity to Christ more intimate than that which existed between Him and her by virtue of her maternity." 25 Therefore, if the Master's principle, "In general, he who wills in orderly fashion, first wills that which is closest to the end," helps us to define above all other creatures the transcendence of Christ in predestination, likewise it can help us, rather it must help us, to locate Mary immediately after Christ. After Him, She is the one creature closest to the end intended by God in predestination.

It follows that while Christ owes-as we have said-everything (glory, grace and hypostatic union) to the pure and simple liberality of God, Mary, for her part, owes-as we shall see-everything (glory, grace and maternity) to the pure and simple liberality of the Son. Thus in the divine plan as understood by Scotus, Christ is "the greatest good of God"26 and Mary is "the greatest good of the Mediator." 27



Footnotes

1. Rep., Ill, d. 7, q. 4, n. 5 (Vives, 303 b): Ordinatio, ibid., 23, n. 3 (Vives 14, 354 b; d. 32, q. un., n. 6 (Vives 15, 433 a). "I say, therefore, that the fall was not the cause of Christ's predestination; indeed, even had neither angel nor man fallen, Christ would still have been predestined in the same way, indeed, even if no one but Christ had been created" (Rep., ibid., n. 4). [back]
2. Ordinatio, III, d. 7, q. 3, n. 3 (Vives 14, 354): "Since anyone's predestination to glory precedes...foreknowledge of sin..., so much the more is this true of the soul (of Christ) predestined to the highest glory." [back]
3. Ibid.: "In general, anyone willing in an orderly manner first wills what is
closest to the end." [back]
4. Rep.Barcinon., Ill, d. 7, q. 3 (Elementa, 183): "it does not seem that the predestination of Christ, who was predestined to be Head of the heavenly court, was occasioned by the fall or demerit of the damned. God, then, first loves Himself and then what is nearest to this love, to wit, He loves in such
wise that the soul of Christ should have the highest glory in the Word. This, then, was the first object willed among all the creatures willed by God." [back]
5. Ordinatio, III, d. 32, q. un., n. 6 (Vives 15, 433; cod. Ass. fol. 174 rb):"God loves Himself first..., second He wills to have co-lovers, which is to will others to have His love in them"; on this cf. R. rosini, Le virtu cristiane nel pensiero di Duns Scoto, tra i documenti (doc. IV) nella Positio super cultuatque virtutibus loannis Duns Scoti, Romae 1988, p. 510. [back]
6. St. jerome, In Epistulam ad Ephesios, 1. 1, c. 1, n. 552. [back]
7. Cf. supra, notes 19-21. [back]
8. Cf. B. H. merkelbach, OP, Mariologia, Parisiis 1939, p. 95: "theologians ask...whether Christ, had Adam not sinned, still have come with the Mother of God." He then goes on to explain, suddenly shifting terminology: "Would God, on the hypothesis that He wished to create a world different from the present one and in accord with the providence governing such a hypothesis, have decreed an Incarnation? This is a ridiculous question, nor do theologians deal with it, since it is a mere hypothesis, and therefore unsolvable." Clearly the author either never read or never understood what Scotus actually said, and hence it is rather this theologian's argumentation that is "ridiculous." The Subtle Doctor is discussing the "real" world, not a "hypothetical" one. He is talking about a world which as it was "conceived," such was it "created," so did it "exist." That afterwards sin should have affected its existence, was neither the will of God nor something brought to pass by God. Hence, the divine plan, according to the Subtle Doctor, regards before all else the predestination to glory of all the elect (cf. note 19) and first among these is Christ (ibid.), even before the world came to be (cf. note 23) and therefore, all the more before sin entered in. I do not question Fr. Merkelbach's contribution to Mariology, nor his sincerity in pursuit of the truth. But like so many neo-thomist theologians he pays little
attention to what Scotus actually thought and wrote, and bases his very negative assessment on seriously inaccurate and sometimes uncharitable
secondary literature. [back]
9. scotus, Lectura completa, III, d. 7, q. 3 (Elementa 188): "Christ would not have had such glory, nor would He have been so full of grace and truth, unless His nature had subsisted in the subject [person] of the Word"; Rep. Bardnon., Ill, d. 7, q. 3 (Elementa, 180): "And thus there existed something appropriately disposing [Christ] to such great glory, and this [hypostatic] union was that something so disposing." [back]
10. Ibid., Lectura; Rep. Bardnon., ibid.: "because in all action there exists an inverse order governing intention and execution." [back]
11. Lectura completa, ibid. (Elementa, 189): "whether the union of this nature to the Word or its destination to glory was first ordained." [back]
12. Reportata Valentiniensia, III, d. 6, q. 5 (Elementa, 176): "Christ's predestination to glory was prior to that union, because intending an end
is prior to intending those things which are a means to that end." On this question, much discussed among scotists, cf. R. rosini, II Cristocentrismo..., p. 45, note 19. [back]
13. Lectura, III, d. 7, q. 3 (Elementa, 189): "As any agent acting rationally first intends the end and then the means to that end, so God when predestining someone, first wills that person's end and thereafter those things which are means to that end. The end of someone predestined, however, is blessedness and glory, and therefore this is what God first ordained in predestining, and only in a second moment ordained so to unite that nature [hypostatically] as make it fit for such glory"; Ordinatio, III, d. 7, q. 3, n.5 (Vives 14, 358 a-b). [back]
14. Ordinatio, IV, d. 2, q. 1, n. 11 (Vives 248 b); Rep. Barcinon., Ill, d. 7, q. 3 (Elementa, 180): "The glory of Christ was such that it could not be within the capacity of a created nature to merit." To the objection: "it is more glorious to have a reward via merit, than without it" (cf. St. thomas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 19, a. 4, in corpore), Scotus replies: "I maintain that this is true of a reward, which can be had via merits: but this union of the soul of Christ with God in the act of enjoyment was so great and so excellent, that merit could not precede it. In this case it is nobler to enjoy an activity beyond the range of prior merit, in virtue of the liberality of the donor, than to enjoy a lesser activity as the fruit of much prior merit"; (Ordinatio,III, d. 18, q. un., n. 13; Vives 14, 683 b). [back]
15. Ordinatio, III, d. 13, q. 4, n. 9 (Vives 14, 463 b). Two points should be made more precise. 1) "Mercy," according to Scotus, must be understood, not in relation to "pardon" (or to the demerit of a creature), but in relation to the "gift," apart from any consideration of a creature's merit or demerit. Thus, the greatness of mercy is measured by the "gratuity" of the gift: "Mercy cannot be fully explained, unless the highest gift is given without any merit" (Rep., Ill, d. 13, q. 3, n. 14, Vives 23, 337 b). 2) Basing himself on St. AUGUSTINE, De Tr/nitate, 13, c. 9, n. 24 (PL 42, 1033), Scotus defines in what the highest grace consists: "The highest grace is that man be joined to God in the unity of person, and although (Augustine) speaks of grace of union, i.e., the gracious will of God effecting this union, nonetheless concomitantly with this union follows the grace of fruition de facto; therefore," Scotus concludes, "there existed the highest grace without prior merits" (Ordinatio III, d. 18, q. un., n. 12, 14, Vives 683 b). [back]
16. Ordinatio, III, d. 13, q. 4, n. 8 (Vives 14, 461 b): "No other nature could be head of those possessing grace, because there could not be two heads, as neither could there be two sovereigns in the same order... (therefore) in accord with the laws laid down by divine wisdom, there would be but one Head in the Church, from whom grace would flow into the members." [back]
17. Rep. Barcinon., Ill, d. 7, q. 3 (Elementa, 180). The reasoning behind such a doctrine is to be sought precisely in the "means" which dispose to glory. In the blessed, grace constitutes the means, which is subject to merit and in fact is subject to the extrinsic merit (of Christ). In Christ, instead, the hypostatic union constitutes the means. That union being the principle of merit, it cannot be the subject of merit in any way. [back]
18. Cf. supra, note 23. In addition, St. augustine, In loannis Evangelium, tr.105, n. 6 (PL 35, 1910): "In virtue of this predestination (Christ) was already glorified before the world came into existence." [On the joint predestination of Mary with Christ and her place in God's eternal decrees,
cf. dean, A Primer..., cit., pp.105-109.] [back]
19. Cf. supra, note 22. [back]
20. Cf. supra, notes 17 and 21. [back]
21. Cf. supra, notes 9 and 13. [back]
22. Cf. supra, note 4: pseudo-augustine, De Praedestinatione et gratia, c. 5 (PL 45, 1668): "We were made within the world, and chosen before the world: and at one and the same time, neither a passing out of being nor a coming to be, but a continuous duration." [back]
23. Ordinatio, III, d. 7, q. 3(Vives 14, 354 b). As to the "means" to the end, ours differing from that of Christ, see above, note 34. [back]
24. Ordinatio, ibid., 355. We note that: 1) various steps precede the prevision of sin (note 17); 2) these are intimately linked by an intrinsic goodness communicated them by the will of God (note 15); 3) they are ranked from greatest to least, where the first in rank is absolutely independent of the other grades, the lesser depending on the higher and not vice-versa, such that the greatest may exist without the other grades (note 18), and "even had no man or angel fallen, nor had many men been created other than Christ, Christ would still have been predestined" (Elements, 6). [back]
25. Later we will see how Scotus considers Mary linked to Christ via the "natural" bond of motherhood. [back]
26. Ordinatio, III, d. 7, q. 3 (Elementa, 6). [back]
27. Ordinatio, III, d. 3, q. 1 (Elementa, 26). Cf. MERKELBACH, Mariologia, p. 97, where is found a conclusion far distant from ours. He writes: "Hence, there is no reason why Christ and the Blessed Virgin cannot be the final, formal and efficient cause of our salvation in general, and yet also depend on us and on our sin as condition and as the material and dispositive cause. Nor is it irrational to refer the perfect to the imperfect..." (sic! Self-explanatory.). [back]
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